PHILOSOPHIA

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY OF ISRAEL

VOLUME 33, NOS. 1-4 DECEMBER 2005

BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY

Assistant Editor: Na'ama Carmi
Managing Editor: Hanna Braverman

ISSN 0048-3893

Typeset: TAU Graphic Design Studio
Print: Tel Aviv University's Printshop

DEFENDING BERKELEY'S DIVINE IDEAS

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It has long been thought that Berkeley cannot consistently help himself to a theory of divine archetypal ideas in order to explain our perception of the sensible world. Positing the existence of such ideas in God allegedly creates skeptical problems, difficulties about the continuity of sensible objects, puzzles about the privacy of ideas, and worse. Introducing divine ideas allegedly inserts an intermediary between minds and ultimate reality, creating another veil of perception in a new form. Ardently committed to removing skepticism, Berkeley cannot endorse any theory that even hints at representationalism. J.D. Mabbott concludes, "It does not seem likely that Berkeley himself believed in Divine Ideas, at least as a necessary part of his system."[1] These ideas allegedly raise more problems for Berkeley than they solve. Worse yet, they are not even adequate to the challenges they are supposed to overcome. Thus Leopold Stubenberg has insisted that an archetypal theory of divine ideas for Berkeley is 'a complete failure,' unable to provide a stable, continuous, unfragmented world.[2] In general, most commentators have argued that Berkeley ought not to have defended a theory of divine ideas at all.[3]

Much of the skepticism regarding Berkeley's theory of divine ideas depends on a reluctance to assiduously follow Berkeley through his reasoning about the nature of ideas and their relation to genuine substances. My task here is to construct a theory of divine ideas in light of Berkeley's unusual ontology of ideas. I argue here that technically Berkeley did not endorse a divine *archetypal* theory at all; he does not believe that God has an original order of ideas of which our own ideas are copies. Instead, the sensory ideas perceived by finite minds are numerically identical to God's divine ideas.[4] Thus, although one might

(misleadingly) call Berkeley's theory of divine ideas an archetypal theory, this label does not imply that there are distinct archetypes and ectypes in his ontology (of sensory ideas at least). This realization in turn makes not only Berkeley's theory of divine ideas more plausible, it also renders the rest of his metaphysics more consistent and reasonable.

I. Theories of Divine Ideas, Theories of Archetypes

At a minimum it is clear that Berkeley does hold some form of a theory of divine ideas, archetypal or otherwise. Historically divine archetypes are the ideas of God that represent (or for Berkeley, constitute) genuine reality; they are the 'originals' of what we perceive. Their counterparts, ectypes, are copies of these original archetypal ideas. Berkeley knew of archetypes from both Locke and Malebranche. For Locke, our ideas generally are derived from genuine things or properties we encounter in the world. As Locke writes in the *Essay*:

> *First*, By *real Ideas*, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes. *Fantastical or Chimerical*, I call such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that reality of Being, to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to their Archetypes.[5]

Locke, of course, thinks of *most* archetypes as objective, external *material* things, which ideas represent either by causation or by resemblance.[6] Malebranche, unlike Locke, invokes ideas as archetypes for the material world. That is, physical objects are 'reflections' or even ectypes (images) of God's ideas. Consider two representative passages from the *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion*, in which Malebranche's mouthpiece Theodore speaks:

> Ideas have an eternal and necessary existence, and the corporeal world exists only because it pleased God to create it. Thus, to see the intelligible world, it suffices to consult Reason which contains intelligible, eternal, and necessary ideas, the archetype of the visible world.[7]

> Consider attentively the clear idea of extension. It is the archetype of bodies; it represents their nature and properties. Is it not evident that all the possible properties of extension must be simply relations of distance?[8]

Malebranche also adds that ideas, as the substance of God, must be causally efficacious, although how this works is undisclosed. Ultimately he concludes that when we perceive, we 'see' the very archetypes in God, hence the name for this doctrine: 'Vision in God.' When Berkeley talks about divine ideas, one immediately wonders whether he might not be flirting with the Malebranchian position that our ideas just are the archetypes in God. "[D]o I not acknowledge a twofold state of things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God."[9] Positive remarks about archetypes, however, are relatively rare in Berkeley's works,[10] and the majority of those references are negative. When they are not, they are grudging remarks about terms and language use. Thus after Samuel Johnson presses Berkeley about an archetypal understanding of ideas, Berkeley replies:

> I have no objection against calling the ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours. But I object against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real things, and to have an absolute rational existence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatsoever; it being the opinion of all materialists that an ideal existence in the Divine Mind is one thing, and the real existence of material things another.[11]

The reluctance of Berkeley to use the language of archetypes is not surprising given that he generally wants to distance himself from the accounts of Locke and Malebranche. Thus, despite superficial appearances here that Berkeley accepts a robust archetypal understanding of God's ideas (such that they are the originals of our own sensory ideas), there are powerful reasons for thinking that Berkeley wants to make the distance great enough that he will deny this traditional understanding of God's ideas as archetypes.

A divine archetypal theory of ideas presumably solves several pressing problems for Berkeley. First, it provides a solution to what is commonly known as the problem of privacy. Two persons perceive the very same thing in an immaterialist world when their ideas are properly related to the one archetypal idea in God. Second, it removes worries about unperceived parts of the world, since God is always present to perceive everything.[12] As an extension of the last point, it thus preserves the continuity of sensible objects. The objects intermittently perceived by finite minds remain constant without blinking in and out of existence. Unfortunately, none of these problems can be effectively overcome by the standard interpretations of divine *archetype* theories and new difficulties arise. Since this theory introduces our own finite ideas as intermediaries between our understanding and the archetypal ideal reality, Berkeley is smuggling in a representative theory that he himself argues engenders skepticism. Even if our ideas are perfect copies of the archetypes in God, we nonetheless are *not* directly perceiving genuine reality.

All of these alleged inadequacies, however, stem from an incomplete understanding of Berkeley's theory of divine ideas. I will demonstrate that Berkeley does not believe that the archetypal order is inside the mind of God in any sense that implies inherence or that these archetypal ideas are modes. Instead, Berkeley holds that ideas fall into the hybrid ontological category. Ideas are dependent on minds but nonetheless distinct and external to them. The resulting theory of divine ideas survives the above objections and is broadly consistent with the rest of Berkeley's philosophical system.

II. 'In' the Mind of God

Recall that ideas for Berkeley are decidedly dependent beings. Their *esse* is *percipi*. As a result, some divine order of ideas must be maintained by God to preserve the perceived connected and continuous nature of the sensible world.[13] Yet an issue arises as to *where* this order 'resides.'

Some interpretations of Berkeley's theory of divine ideas have emphasized that he posits an archetypal ideal order 'inside' the mind of God. This might mean that ideas are 'in' the mind along the lines of a spatial metaphor, as a color is 'in' an object, or a chair is 'in' a room.

Thus one might say that ideas are 'in' the mind of God in the sense of being a part of God. Berkeley writes, "... the real tree existing without his mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is *exists in*) the infinite mind of God." The parenthetical remark with emphasis *is Berkeley's*. Given that he outright tells us that reality is in the mind of God, some commentators have taken Berkeley seriously.[14] Evidence apparently abounds. For instance, Berkeley explains the continuity of sensible things by appealing to their real existence 'in' God.

> When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them.... it necessary follows, there is an *omnipresent eternal Mind*....[15]

Ideas exist in minds. Yet to suppose that 'in' here should be read as inherence or to treat ideas as monadic properties of minds is an error. Berkeley explains that by 'in the mind' he means nothing more than *ontological dependence*. God's ideas are 'external' to the mind of God in the sense of being in a two-place relation with the mind, meaning only that they are not modes nor proper parts of the divine mind. They are perceived directly, but depend upon the constant perception of God for their existence.

We have here two different conceptual distinctions that run closely together. I preserve the slightly misleading language because it is Berkeley's. Being clear about them as they appear in the texts will help us unravel some otherwise confusing passages. First there is the distinction between an idea being 'in' and 'without' the mind. An idea is 'in' the mind if it is dependent on the mind for its existence. An idea is 'without' the mind if it does not rely on that mind to sustain it.[16] Here we need to be careful, since Berkeley sometimes blurs ontological and volitional independence. In one sense, all the sensory ideas a finite mind has are 'without' because they are independent of the will, even though

the idea itself is still dependent on some mind or other for its existence. Berkeley sometimes expresses this by saying that sensory ideas affect the mind from without. A finite mind may perceive a sensory idea not under its volitional control *and* have that idea be 'in' the mind. Thus, the idea is both 'in' and 'without' the mind. This is not a contradiction, but an infelicitous use of language, since the 'without' here implies only that the idea is independent of the will and not that the idea can exist absent a mind.

Yet a second potential distinction lurks. Ideas may be either internal ('in') or external to the mind, and this implies nothing about dependence. An idea is 'external' to the mind if it is both distinct from the mind and in a two-place relation with it. Note that perception is an 'external' relation. The ideas we have are distinct from us. Berkeley's insight is to note the unusual nature of this relation. The existence of one of the *relata* (the idea) depends on the relation actually holding. Apart from some perceptual relation the idea does not exist. Thus, when we perceive, we are related to a distinct but dependent entity. It is natural to think that this dependence is on the mind in the particular relation in question, although this does not necessarily follow. One might well perceive an idea that is actually being sustained by another mind, or whose sustenance is overdetermined. As a result, 'external' ideas can be neither modes nor proper parts of a mind. On the other hand, an idea is 'internal' to the mind if its relation to the mind can be reduced to a monadic property. Berkeley does not think ideas are internal to the mind in this sense.

In *Principles* 49 Berkeley distinguishes between the dependence of ideas (being 'in' the mind) and their being modes (being 'internal' to the mind).

> Fifthly, it may be objected, that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute, which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by way of *idea*; and it no more follows, that the soul or mind is extended because extension exists

> in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else.[17]

Ideas are not modes of the mind and thus are not present 'in' the mind in that sense. Then what does it mean to say that qualities are 'in' the mind 'as they are perceived by it?' 'In' expresses nothing more than dependence. Berkeley uses this odd phraseology to distance himself from materialist confusions, but his position is unmistakable.

> When I speak of objects as existing in the mind or imprinted on the senses; I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself.[18]

When perceiving a sensory idea, the mind is *affected* from another source, making ideas dependent but decidedly external (in the Berkeleian sense) beings. God's archetypal order is a set of ideas external to His mind, but 'in' it in the sense that it depends on His perceiving them.[19] This is not an isolated use of the language. "Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of [*i.e.* external to] my mind: but being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise in [i.e. are dependent upon] an understanding: there is therefore an understanding."[20]

One might object, however, that I have left out an alternative possibility. Perhaps Berkeley takes ideas to be a special kind of monadic property.[21] In *Principles* 49 when he says that ideas are not in the mind by way of mode or attribute he might mean that the following proposition P is false: $(\forall x)$(x is in substance S entails S is x). If an idea were a mode or an attribute, this proposition would be true, but ideas are predicated of the mind in such a way that this proposition remains false. Thus, ideas could be a kind of thing predicated of the mind such that the mind does not become what is predicated of it. Having an idea of blue means that the mind has a monadic predicate without itself being blue. I agree that Berkeley needs to keep P false, but I deny that he can allow that ideas

are predicated monadically of minds. There are two reasons for this. First, I have no sense of what it might mean ontologically for an idea to be predicated of the mind yet not be a mode or part of the mind. There is no textual evidence from Berkeley of which I am aware that suggests he is thinking in this way (or what it might mean). Second, attributing this view to him immediately forces him into skeptical problems. If the ideas that finite minds have are properties of those minds they are thus numerically distinct from those of God. That would make the ideas we directly perceive distinct from the divine ideas that constitute sensible reality and Berkeley cannot consistently allow any such result.

The depth of his anti-skepticism runs deeper than simply denying the existence of a material substratum. In the preface to the *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, Berkeley makes the stakes quite high.

> *Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise* skepticism *and* paradoxes. *It is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing. Its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed.*[22]

Anything that separates us from the real nature of things will engender skepticism. This is perhaps more obviously true for material substances, but it would nonetheless cause embarrassment if it turned out that the ideas we perceive are not in fact the real things, but only copies of them. Even were one to suppose that our ideas are copies of God's ideas, doubt could re-emerge concerning the perfection of the copies. And Berkeley does not believe his system will allow for *any* doubt. "*If the principles, which I here endeavour to propagate, are admitted for true; the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence, are, that* atheism *and* skepticism *will be utterly destroyed....*"[23] He is consistent on this point. While engaging Hylas on this very issue, Berkeley has Philonous remark:

> It is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images, or copies of them. Our knowledge

> therefore is no farther real, than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all.[24]

The explicit target here, of course, is material archetypes, but the point applies perfectly well against immaterial archetypes as well. Any view that creates a numerical difference between the ideas that constitute genuine reality and the ideas had by finite minds will engender skepticism. Thus it will always be slightly misleading to say of Berkeley's theory of divine ideas that it is an archetypal theory, even if Berkeley himself is forced upon occasion to use that language as well.

Berkeley sometimes argues against archetypes precisely because they are said to be without the mind and this has engendered some confusion. "But if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to *things* or *archetypes* existing without the mind, then we are involved all in *scepticism*. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things."[25] Yet note the parallel use of language. 'Without the mind' here means 'independent of the mind.' Berkeley attacks archetypal views (like Locke's) because they posit archetypal orders that are ontically independent, and hence on the other side of the veil of perception.[26] He clarifies his position in a letter to Samuel Johnson, also quoted earlier:

> I have no objection against calling the ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours. But I object against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real things, and to have an absolute rational existence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatsoever; it being the opinion of all materialists that an ideal existence in the Divine Mind is one thing, and the real existence of material things another.[27]

To make sense of this remark it is necessary to introduce Johnson's questioning as a background. In the previous letter, Johnson pressed Berkeley to clarify his position on the nature of divine ideas. Johnson

mistakes Berkeley's insistence that ideas are an 'exterior existence' for an archetypal theory of ideas.

> From those and the like expressions, I gathered what I said about the archetypes of our ideas, and thence inferred that there is exterior to us, in the divine mind, a system of universal nature, whereof the ideas we have are in such degree resemblances as the Almighty is pleased to communicate to us.... The divine idea, therefore, of a tree I suppose (or a tree in the divine mind), must be the original or archetype of ours, and ours a copy or image of His (our ideas images of His, in the same sense as our souls are images of Him) of which there may be several, in several created minds, like so many several pictures of the same original to which they are all to be referred.[28]

What is unusual about this exchange is that Johnson is here expanding and enlarging on questions he had already asked in a previous letter (10 September 1729). Berkeley, however, initially simply refuses to address these questions. Only after Johnson continued to voice his concerns again did Berkeley finally relent and respond with two short sentences, neither of which actually endorses the reading Johnson advanced. Berkeley's real concern in denying such ideas and archetypes is only that dependence on minds be retained without introducing skepticism. Otherwise archetypes (as Berkeley would say, 'if you wish to call them that') *are* without the mind of God and constitute reality. As a result, sometimes Berkeley denies the possibility of archetypes, as when he attacks Lockean versions which marry independence with them. At other time Berkeley is willing to allow the use of the term, but only because it does aptly describe divine ideas as originals that constitute reality. I cannot explain why Berkeley refuses to straightforwardly admit to Johnson that God's ideas are numerically identical to the ideas of sense had by finite minds (and hence deny that God's ideas are strictly speaking archetypes in the sense of being originals of which we have copies), but the exchange is suitably odd as to convince me that something is amiss in the correspondence.[29]

The main point is straightforward. Only God's divine world of ideas is genuinely continuous.[30] Thus, if our (individual) worlds are to be continuous and independent of us as well, they must be identical with God's world. If we recall a few of Berkeley's central claims, the conclusion seems hard to deny. Berkeley asserts:

(1) We know the appearances of things.

(2) The appearances of things constitute their reality.

(3) Therefore we know the reality of things.

When we add,

(4) Genuine reality is contained only 'in' God,

we are driven (with or without Berkeley's consent) to the conclusion that what we know is contained 'in' God. Now, however, we see that this implies only that what we see is *preserved* by God in an 'external' set of divine ideas. Importantly, this does not imply that ideas are enduring beings, but only that the continuity we perceive is maintained (in whatever form) by God. What follows is that we, like God, directly perceive these ideas. Thus, we directly perceive an external but mind-dependent reality.

The claim that our sensory ideas are numerically identical with God's archetypes might spark some controversy. David Yandell has already argued that it must be false that God perceives the same ideas finite perceivers do.[31] Yet this opinion traditionally relies, as it does with Yandell, on the commonly held view that ideas are 'in' minds in some literal sense. Berkeley famously says that God knows or has ideas, but they are not carried to Him 'by sense' as it is with finite minds.[32] We can feel or sense pain, but although God knows pain, He does not sense or feel it as we do. Hence, we cannot perceive the very same ideas God does. Yet this conclusion simply does not follow. It follows only that we do not come to have ideas in the same way God does. We 'sense' pain; God 'knows' pain; but there is no suggestion that the pains in question are numerically distinct. It is possible that the difference can be explained by the nature of the relation and not the nature of the *relata*. The worry, of course, is that if ideas are like modes of the mind, God could not help but feel (sense) pain as we do if He has the idea of pain. But if God's ideas (like all sensory ideas) are external to the substance of God then

nothing prevents the relation between God and His archetypes from being different from that of finite ideas and those same archetypes. And this is exactly the kind of distinction Berkeley invokes. Consider PC 675: "God May comprehend all Ideas even the Ideas which are painfull & unpleasant without being in any degree pained thereby. Thus we our selves can imagine the pain of a burn etc. without any misery or uneasiness at all." Here the suggestion is that God knows the ideas we sense in a similar manner to how we remember or imagine past pains. Berkeley makes the point generally as well. "God knows or hath ideas; but His ideas are not convey'd to him by sense, as ours are."[33] The *object* of perception is the same; the *nature of the relation* varies. Although I find that this reading handles the point well, it should be remarked that *all* of the traditional interpretations of Berkeley on divine ideas fall afoul of this problem and mine at least has the merit of being more charitable to Berkeley. The point remains that asserting numerical identity between our sensory ideas and God's ideas is epistemologically necessary from Berkeley's point of view to defeat skepticism and is at least theologically defensible on the grounds that the nature of the perceptual relation varies for God and finite minds.

Although we now have the position laid out before us, one might object that this leaves Berkeley with an incomprehensible view. What exactly does it mean to say that ideas are 'external' to but dependent on God? Since ideas are dependent they cannot be substances (and Berkeley tells us that spirit is the only proper substance anyway) and he explicitly tells us that they are not modes. So what are they? I think it clear, by the analysis provided here that Berkeley has carved out a new ontological category, which I call 'quasi-substance.' A quasi-substance is both ontically dependent upon, yet distinct from, other proper substances. This understanding of ideas is surprisingly coherent and fits well with the rest of Berkeley's system. Motivating this reading of Berkeley in application to divine ideas will occupy us for the remainder of this discussion.

III. Permutations

At this point we can formulate four kinds of possible divine archetype

theories based on the two distinctions mentioned earlier. For clarity, they are:

(1) *God's archetypes are in God and internal to Him.* Archetypal ideas are both dependent upon God, and either a mode or proper part of God.

(2) *God's archetypes are without God and internal to Him.* Archetypal ideas can exist without God (they are independent of Him), but are nonetheless somehow a mode or proper part of God. One might make sense of this view by arguing that some parts of God are not essential to Him, although such a claim would engender considerable controversy.

(3) *God's archetypes are in God and external to Him.* God's archetypes depend on Him for their existence, but they are neither a mode nor proper part of God. Such ideas would be related to God in a two (or more) place relation, making them distinct from the nature of God, despite being dependent on Him.

(4) *God's archetypes are without God and external to Him.* This is the familiar Lockean view where archetypal objects do not depend on God perceiving them. If there were material archetypes, they would fall under this category.

Berkeley, by his own reasoning, can only plausibly endorse the third of these alternatives, but let's examine the other possibilities first to see why they are unsuitable.

Malebranche endorses (1). Our ideas are intellectual concepts in the substance of God. Hence we get the 'Vision in God' thesis. We literally perceive God's ideas within His substance. Berkeley works hard to distance himself from Malebranche, and not only for political reasons.

> As to what is said of ranking me with Father Malebranche and Mr. Norris, whose writings are thought too fine spun to be of any great use to mankind, I have this to answer: that I think the notions I embrace are not in the least coincident with, or agreeing with, theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with them in the main points, insomuch that I know few writers whom I take myself at bottom to differ more from than them.[34]

To be certain, Berkeley's views do differ from that of Norris and Malebranche, and in several important respects. However, his commitment to a divine order of ideas created by God is a decidedly Malebranchian point and I speculate that he learned this from the famous Frenchman. That is, Berkeley takes Malebranche as his starting point when theorizing about ideas and then diverges from him as he adds his own metaphysical insights. Importantly, none of Berkeley's reasons for denying an affinity with Malebranche have anything to do with the nature of divine ideas. Yet given that the views are reasonably close in origin, why is Berkeley so adamant about their differences? Although there is a political element to his move, Berkeley has genuine and reasonable objections to other features of Malebranche's philosophy.

> Few men think, yet all will have opinions. Hence, men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets, which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised, if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche, though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains we are deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended things; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine.[35]

Berkeley lists his complaints. (1) Malebranche relies on abstract ideas. (2) He asserts the existence of external material world, which serves no explanatory purpose and is odious to God's simplicity of design. And (3) he preserves the structures that allow for the same pernicious skepticism that Locke engendered with his views.

Nicholas Jolley has highlighted the first point, rightly arguing that Malebranchian ideas in God share the same problematic indeterminacy as Lockean abstract ideas do.[36] An abstract idea of a triangle, which

must be neither scalene, nor right, nor isosceles, yet all of them as well, is indeterminate. Ideas, as particular things, must be fully determinate. And, as Berkeley argues in the draft introduction to the *Principles*, "It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive, that which God cannot cause to be?"[37] If God cannot form abstract ideas, then such ideas cannot exist in God either.[38] It is, I think, still an open question whether Malebranchian ideas are subject to Berkeley's attack. Yet if Malebranche would allow ideas like the Lockean idea of triangle, one which no particular existing triangle could instantiate, then Berkeley's concerns are warranted. More obviously, the second and third complaints are clear points of departure for Berkeley. He denies the duality of worlds between the mental and physical, and similarly rejects the skeptical dangers he sees arising from such a division. Berkeley will not advocate any theory that maintains an intermediary between minds and ultimate reality.

Yet are these differences enough for us to conclude, as Berkeley does, that "there are no principles more fundamentally opposite than [Malebranche's] and [his]?" I have my doubts. There are political considerations here as well. Berkeley was perhaps too eager to argue that his principles conformed to the beliefs of the common person and insofar as Malebranche's views were already popularly thought of as unusual and decidedly not mainstream, it only makes sense that Berkeley would labor diligently and vociferously to distance himself from the shadow of Malebranche. It was not until after he received critical reviews of his main works that he added pointed sections to later editions trying to separate himself from the likes of Norris and Malebranche. Berkeley's labors also indicate to some degree the affinities he shares with Malebranche's doctrine of Vision in God, especially the underlying theory of divine ideas.

Returning to our options, Berkeley cannot endorse options (2) or (4) since they deny the dependent nature of ideas. *All* ideas are fundamentally dependent beings, even those (perhaps especially those) perceived by God. If God's ideas constitute sensible reality, then even if our ideas were perfect copies of those divine ideas we would still not directly perceive reality. The problem of skepticism dominates Berkeley's thinking, so

much so that the introduction to the *Principles* presents the work as one that promises to eliminate it. His skeptical worries preclude him from endorsing any theory that would reintroduce a veil in a representative theory of perception.

That leaves us prepared for (3): God's ideas are dependent upon and external to the divine mind. One should hasten to emphasize here that the dependence of God's ideas does not imply that God's ideas are dependent in any way on finite minds; they depend on God's mind. They are, nonetheless, essentially dependent beings. God created an ideal order external to Himself and during sensation we directly perceive those very divine ideas.[39] And what should we say about Berkeley's occasional invocation of archetype/ectype language? On my analysis, ectypes only exist for ideas of the imagination. The sensory ideas we perceive simply *are* reality. The distinction nonetheless makes sense because we do dream and hallucinate and otherwise have ectypal ideas of the imagination. Berkeley is not as lucid as one might like in his published works, but in his notebooks he makes a fortuitously explicit claim: "Ideas of Sense are the Real things or Archetypes. Ideas of Imagination, Dreams, etc. are copies, images of these."[40] A more compelling bit of supporting evidence would be hard to find. If our sensory ideas were ectypes in any way then Berkeley would have effectively re-introduced the veil of perception he has labored so hard to remove. We thus have good reason not only to reject the alternatives, but also endorse (3) as Berkeley's considered view. The real test of my interpretation, naturally, will come when we examine how well it handles the problems that theories of divine ideas allegedly cannot overcome. I turn now to those challenges.

IV. Defending the Theory of Divine Ideas

As mentioned earlier, there are a number of difficulties in attributing any theory of divine ideas to Berkeley, yet overall the picture is decidedly stronger than any of the traditional theories attributed to Berkeley inside the early modern tale. I do not wish my defense of this reading of Berkeley to be confused with a defense of its overall philosophical merit, but I do wish to argue that my interpretation makes him more

philosophically respectable than the alternatives. Berkeley's position is more sophisticated than it is generally given credit.

My interpretation lets us solve one problem immediately. A straightforward consequence of asserting that ideas had by finite minds are identical to those of God is that we might not always be able to tell whether any of 'my' ideas are exclusive to me. It might be the case that the very (sensory) idea I perceive now is also being perceived by another finite mind (in a case where two persons are perceiving the same divine archetype). That is, 'my' ideas are not logically dependent on my perceiving them, which denies the privacy of ideas. Generally this is not a concern, since God perceives all the (sensory or archetypal) ideas I do as well.[41] Hence, my sensory ideas do not really logically depend on my having them anyway, since God ultimately preserves them. It is important to recognize that at no time does Berkeley ever assert that ideas are wedded to particular individuals.[42] He carefully maintains the view that ideas depend for their existence only on some mind or other. Ideas of imagination may still remain private and thus Berkeley can continue to do some justice to our intuitions about the privacy of ideas, but only insofar as they extend to the imagination. I grant that certain passages can be reasonably read as endorsing privacy for ideas, but none of them exclusively so. No doubt it is a natural inclination to treat all ideas as private (as being like our 'own' images) and so Berkeley might occasionally lapse. His philosophical view, however, differs. It might sound odd to say that our sensory perceptions are not genuinely private, but Berkeley can simply exhort us to set aside our vulgar confusions which stem from a mistaken adherence to materialism. If God is the author of the sensible world, in what sense *could* our ideas be genuinely private? At least God would always share them.[43] The only ideas which are truly our own are those we conjure ourselves. Interestingly, I think Berkeley even uses this consequence to solve other, more pressing worries.

One such worry is the problem of continuity for sensible objects. Since my ideas only exist when perceived, if those ideas are dependent only upon me then their existence is fragmented at best. But if there is no privacy for my ideas because they are numerically identical with those

'in' (i.e. dependent upon) God or other minds, then the continuity of sensible objects is guaranteed, or at least explained. The tree I see outside my window is the 'same' tree as I saw five minutes ago, because its continuity is preserved in a divine world of ideas to which I have access. One might object, as Stubenberg does, that this view only guarantees that *something* exists when I close my eyes, but not necessarily the same tree as I saw earlier.[44] Perhaps so, but for Berkeley this is not a worry. It may simply happen that God continuously creates numerically distinct but qualitatively similar ideas over time. From our perspective, whether there is one set of numerically identical ideas or a larger set filled with distinct but qualitatively identical ideas, nothing changes. On the other hand, if we do discover qualitative differences, then the sameness of the tree becomes a verbal dispute, based on how one wants to capture 'sameness' without respect to qualitative identity.[45] Since we have no access to other methods that could guarantee an answer, Stubenberg is asking for an answer no finite mind can provide. Whether it is one idea or many that preserves the apparent continuity of the sensible world, all we really know is that the world appears continuous. Generally speaking, so long as I perceive divine ideas -- and the tree I perceive now and the one I perceive later are qualitatively identical -- there are no other issues to resolve. The trees are the same tree in the only sense of 'same' that matters. When I perceive differences in my ideas over time, I can track certain patterns and continuities in what I sense, and no other pretensions or abstractions will tell me more about the world as I perceive it. As a result, the initial worry most have about Berkeley's system -- that it makes our worlds fragmentary and discontinuous -- depends on concerns that simply do not matter. At any rate, we *do* notice a regularity and constancy in our perceptions, and that is enough for Berkeley.[46]

The most frequently cited worry, however, stems from Berkeley's firm claim that ideas are utterly inert.[47] God allegedly causes me to have the sensory ideas I do. Yet those ideas cannot be caused by the divine ideas in God, since ideas are passive. What role, then, do divine ideas play in the ontology? Should we not use Ockham's razor to remove this odious appendage to his system? Stubenberg also raises this as a difficulty. "This consideration suggests that God's ideas, construed

as archetypes, play no role in the explanation of the sensory ideas of created beings. Thus, paradoxically, divine ideas appear as dispensable ontological baggage...."[48]

We might, however, reintroduce the need for divine ideas if we consider the difference between divine and finite knowledge of reality. If God is going to cause me to have an idea, and that idea is a real thing, then God must be creating something independent of my volition. God does not need archetypes to cause me to have ideas, but *we* need divine ideas to perceive a real, continuous, unfragmented world. If Berkeley's immaterial world is to be continuous and ultimately real, then he needs to establish it in a way that allows our access to it while preventing skeptical problems. The order of ideas set down by God is Berkeley's hypothesis about how this works.[49] As a result, divine ideas are created by God *for us*, not simply for Himself. This also helps us to explain why people can err in perception. When we err, we are not creating ideas which inadequately resemble reality. Instead, we are making poor inferences on the basis of the 'real' ideas themselves. Error is the result of mental operation and does not create or distort the order of reality by introducing new 'false' ideas. Ideas of imagination are dependent on our wills, as Berkeley says, and are less real only because of that dependence on our mental activity.[50] So, Stubenberg's criticism applies only if one preserves the numerical distinction between the ideas 'in' God and those in finite minds.

Mabbott, in presenting a similar objection to Berkeley, considers the possibility that our ideas are numerically identical with the divine ideas of God. He dismisses this option because it "is still open to the objection that things passive and inert can be no part of God...."[51] Yandell pursues the same course, explicitly identifying the claim with Malebranche's 'vision in God' doctrine.

> Our ideas, since they are ideas of sensation, cannot therefore be perceived by God. Moreover, Philonous has said in the Second Dialogue that we do not perceive God's ideas (3D 215). There is plainly no doctrine of vision in God, nor any doctrine that we perceive God's ideas, in Berkeley's theory.[52]

Others have engaged the possibility of identifying our sensory ideas with the ideas of God and rejected it as well.[53] The interpretation I am presenting requires that one read Berkeley's divine ideas as external to God's being, but because of their inertness this is precisely what we should expect! I take this to be some evidence that my reading is right. Malebranche, of course, puts the divine order within God, and Berkeley is clear about his objection to this alternative:

> I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, purely active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are, which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypotheses, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a spirit.[54]

Divine ideas are needed to bring to order and ground reality for finite spirits and this can be done without lessening the divine nature of God by simply moving the ideas outside of Him.

One might, however, seek to extend the original criticism. Positing divine ideas does not explain how two persons can perceive the 'same' idea. Berkeley says that the existence of an archetype "serves all the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind."[55] Yet although this might work for Locke, whose material archetypes are causally empowered and independent of all minds, how can causally inert ideas explain how two persons perceive the same idea? This problem becomes pressing since Berkeley clearly thinks that divine *ideas* bear the explanatory weight here. Fortunately we already have the resources to answer this objection. When two minds perceive the (qualitatively) same idea, they are both directed *by God* to the same (at least qualitatively identical) idea. God causes us to perceive the ideas we do, but that need not entail that there are archetypes that serve as causal intermediaries. The divine idea itself causes nothing; it is what is (passively) perceived. Now we say, for the sake of convenience, that 'our' ideas are the same as that of others

because they 'match' the divine idea, but strictly speaking that language is misleading since from our standpoint sensory we cannot distinguish between ideas are that numerically identical and those that are distinct but qualitatively identical. Thus, without invoking numerical diversity or a causal role, divine ideas do explain how diverse persons can perceive the 'same' thing. The 'thing' perceived is the divine idea and its qualitative content. Whether that means you and I perceive numerically one idea or two does not matter to Berkeley, who thinks the question bears no philosophical weight.

Another concern about my interpretation might stem from its characterization of Berkeleian ideas and revisits the concern about privacy.[56] The traditional reading of Berkeley takes sensory ideas to be 'private' in the sense that they are importantly dependent on individual perceivers. He thus writes at *Principles* 4 that we only perceive "our own ideas and sensations." The general tone of the early parts of the *Principles* does seem to imply – but not explicitly indicate – that sensory ideas are as dependent on finite minds as ideas of the imagination are. Here, however, what many take to be indicative of Berkeley's carefully accepted view, I see as evidence of a strategic rhetorical plan. Consider *Principles* 3:

> That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended and combined together cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.

Notice the progression. Berkeley starts with the sorts of ideas everyone acknowledges are dependent on individual minds. For me to experience a passion, or to generate some fantastical idea, is *for me* to sustain that passion or idea. On that basis, he moves to argue that sensory ideas must also be mind-dependent. Yet he shifts from saying that ideas cannot exist without *the* mind, to arguing that (sensory) ideas cannot exist without *a* mind. There is no indication that with sensory ideas finite minds sustain them, only that a finite mind has some relation to them,

and that they are dependent on some mind. At a minimum it is reasonable to argue that my reading is more charitable to Berkeley, especially if it succeeds in saving the otherwise troubled theory of divine ideas.

An immediate consequence of accepting the non-private nature of ideas is that there will be some unusual divine ideas. Pains, for instance, as sensory ideas will be ideas preserved by God. We should welcome this result. Pains behave much like other sensory experiences. They are generally not under our voluntary control and they are regularly associated with other sorts of sensory experiences. One should be suspect of any theory that attempts to separate out some sensory ideas from others. The only obvious worry with positing divine ideas of pains is that it appears to entail that God *has* pains, a worry with which we dispensed earlier.

Assuming that this account survives the presence of divine ideas for sensations like pain, perhaps one might continue to hesitate about the nature and number of divine ideas. One could ask whether God has an idea for each bit of content that *could be* perceived, or only ideas for those things *actually* perceived by finite minds. I do not have an answer here, nor do I think that Berkeley has one. Presumably Berkeley would opt, *ceteris paribus*, for the response most consistent with the simple nature of God, saying that God does not need to preserve ideas where there is no need to do so. However, I see no obstacle or serious defect in either option. There might well be many more divine ideas if God preserves all those which simply *might* be perceived, but that in and of itself presents no difficulty. Even if God must maintain an idea for every qualitatively distinct potential experience, that admission does not appear decisive.

V. Fleeting Ideas, Permanent Ideas

This concern about the nature of divine ideas does lead to one last, more serious objection. Berkeleian ideas, and hence divine ideas as well, are "inert, fleeting, dependent beings."[57] Yet the divine ideas described here are continuous and enduring things. Berkeley speaks of the archetypal order as "eternal."[58] How might we reconcile these apparently conflicting claims? The supposition that all ideas must be

fleeting and changeable is so ingrained in the secondary literature that I have not found anyone who has stopped to investigate seriously what this might mean. I suggest here that the origin of Berkeley's claim that ideas are fleeting and changeable is only a reference to the appearance of the sensible world as one that continually changes. That is, ideas are fleeting in so far as we are in relation to a quick succession of ideas, which in turn does not imply anything about the metaphysical nature of the ideas themselves, aside from the short duration of their relation to minds.

There are three considerations I want to advance to defend the claim that ideas need not be intrinsically fleeting and inconstant as one might at first glance believe. The first is a parity of reasoning argument. In the *Three Dialogues* Berkeley has Philonous argue that the supposition of a material substratum does not make sense because it is not possible to have an idea, which is fleeting and changeable, of a permanent and unchanging substance.

> PHILONOUS: How then is it possible, that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas, should be copies or images of any thing fixed and constant? Or in other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c. that is, our ideas are continually changing upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?[59]

On one level Berkeley is perfectly consistent in employing the likeness principle here, since he readily admits that we do not have ideas of mental substances either. The problem, however, is that this same argument can be used against his claim that there is an eternal archetypal order. If an idea can only copy or represent something to which it is like in kind, and ideas cannot represent material things *because* they are constant when ideas are not, then ideas cannot represent or copy eternal,

unchanging archetypes either. From this we might simply attribute confusion to Berkeley, or perhaps that he missed this particular tension. I prefer to contend that Berkeley's reference to the eternality of archtypes is a reference to the eternality of the archetypal *order* (insofar as Berkeley is even willing to adopt that language, about which he is clearly hesitant). The order and arrangement of the divine ideas is constant and eternal even if the individual ideas are not. Note that the *Three Dialogues* where Berkeley speaks of eternality is most naturally read as a claim about the order and not the ideas. "[D]o I not acknowledge a twofold state of things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God."[60] The reference of 'archetypal and eternal' is to the *state of things* and not to the individual ideas.

The second reason for thinking that ideas are not all equally fleeting is that Berkeley says that they are not. The ideas of sense we as finite minds have are, of course, fleeting and changeable, but they are not nearly as fleeting as other ideas we have.

> PHILONOUS: But on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they [ideas] should exist in, and be produced by, a spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and by an act of my Will can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though it must be confessed, ***these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses***, which latter are called real things. From all which I conclude, there is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. And from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension. Mark it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will, of an infinite spirit. And is not

> all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in it, than what a little observation of our own minds, and that which passes in them not only enableth us to conceive, but also obligeth us to acknowledge?[61]

Berkeley clearly has a distinction in play between the permanence of sensory ideas and those of the imagination. Ideas are fleeting for Berkeley because they are constantly changing before our mind. But this constant change is not strictly speaking a feature of the *ideas*, but of a *series* of ideas being put in relation to our mind. Thus, when Berkeley says that ideas are fleeting and changeable, this is again perhaps best viewed as a reference to the *sequence* or *order* of ideas that we perceive. The above passage can then be reasonably read as indicating that ideas of imagination tend to be unstable, fragmented, and hence fleeting and changeable. The ideas of sense we have change as we experience the world as a rapid sequence of sensory contents, but this is nonetheless more 'permanent' because the order of the ideas we perceive is neither fragmented nor unstable, but instead regular and predictable. I can find no other consistent and plausible way to defend the coherence of his claims here with the assertions about the fleeting nature of ideas.

A final consideration helps to confirm my interpretation. In the *Siris*, Berkeley attempts to ground his own immaterialist philosophy in the history of ancient philosophy. He describes what he means by the changeable and fleeting nature of ideas by aligning it with those ancients (presumably Heraclitus) who characterized reality as 'flowing.' He then sets up a distinction between individual acts of sensation and the intelligible whole.

> In effect, if we mean by things the sensible objects, these, it is evident, are always flowing; but if we mean things purely intelligible, then we may say on the other hand, with equal truth, that they are immovable and unchangeable. So that those who thought the Whole, or {τό παν}, to be {εν έστώς}, a fixed or permanent One, seem to have understood the Whole of real beings, which in their sense was only the intellectual world, not allowing reality of being to things not permanent.[62]

The distinction being drawn is between *individual parts of reality* and *the entire order of nature*. Individual sensible things, ideas, are fleeting and changing because the order of nature expresses a dynamic principle. But that principle, the order of nature, is itself an unchanging and permanent whole. This captures quite well what Berkeley appears to invoke in his discussions of divine ideas. The individual divine ideas, like all ideas, are changing. But the order of divine ideas is itself an eternal and immutable structure.

No doubt there are additional issues to be considered, but none of the traditional arguments against attributing a divine archetype theory of ideas to Berkeley retains merit. Once we recognize that ideas, including divine ideas, are external, dependent entities we can construct a perfectly reasonable theory of divine ideas within his philosophical system. This can perhaps be made most clear by answering two questions about a particular situation involving sensory ideas. First, are God's ideas 'in' Him in the sense of being a part of God? Second, do I directly perceive God's ideas? The first answer is as emphatically 'No' as the answer to the latter is emphatically 'Yes.' God's ideas are external to but dependent on Him. These divine ideas constitute the sensible reality which finite minds perceive directly, ensuring that skepticism is held at bay. The theory preserves our intuitions about the continuity of sensible objects and their existence when not perceived by finite minds. Combining the explanatory power and fit of this interpretation with its ability to meet the traditional complaints directed toward it yields an excitingly cogent result. Thus, a theory of divine ideas remains a consistent, and I dare say plausible, option for Berkeley given his immaterialist philosophy.

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NOTES

1 Mabbott 1968, 373.

2 Stubenberg 1990, 226.

3 *Cf.* Acton 1967, 301 (alleges that archetypes lead Berkeley back into skepticism), Stack 1970, esp. 71, Tipton 1988, 344ff., and Warnock 1982, 124. Kenneth Winkler is an unusual exception, but even there the view he attributes to Berkeley is a weak version of an archetype theory at best. See Winkler 1989, 228-32.

4 To my pleasant surprise, I am not the first to argue for this explicit thesis. *Cf.* Raynor 1987, esp. 613. Raynor's article is not directed at establishing this thesis, but he does stop and explicitly indicate that he thinks this is a view Berkeley likely held.

5 Locke 1975, 372 (II.30.1).

6 Locke also speaks of some archetypes as complex ideas, as in the case of abstract notions like incest and adultery. *Cf.* Locke 1975, 429 (III.5.3).

7 Malebranche 1997a, 9.

8 Malebranche 1997a, 38. *Cf.* Malebranche 1997b, 320.

9 Berkeley 1948-57, 3D 254. The following abbreviations will be used for convenience: 3D: *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, PC: *Philosophical Commentaries* (the notebooks), PHK: *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Other works, not abbreviated, are also from this source. Section numbers will be used for the *Principles*; all other references from the *Works* refer to volume and page numbers.

10 Archetypes are mentioned a mere three times in the *Principles* (sections 45, 87, and 99), twice as many times in the *Dialogues* (206, 212, 214, 240, 248, and 254-5), and a few times in the correspondence with Johnson. See also PC 823.

11 Berkeley 1948-57, vol. II, 292, Letter to Johnson 24 March 1730. Given the amount of careful time and space Johnson gives to the issue of archetypes, Berkeley's response is curiously brief.

12 One might try to solve the continuity problem by invoking phenomenalism, as Kenneth Winkler has done. However, a detailed refutation of phenomenalist interpretations of Berkeley lies outside the scope of the present work. At a minimum Berkeley *does* explicitly invoke divine ideas, which is a sufficient ground for being clear about the philosophical implications. *Cf.* Winkler 1989, esp. 191-203.

13 This does not necessarily imply that archetypes are themselves continuously existing beings. The divine order of ideas can be continuous in terms of

the content they represent (their appearances) without the ideas themselves being necessarily permanent. When Berkeley says that part of the state of things is 'archetypal and eternal' (3D 254) that is a reference to the *order* of ideas and not to the nature of the ideas themselves.

14 For instance, Peter Wenz argues "Nowhere does Berkeley deny the existence of archetypal *ideas*, archetypes existing *within* the mind of God...." (original emphasis). Wenz 1976, 541.

15 3D 230-1.

16 Thus this is a conceptual distinction only since Berkeley denies that ideas can exist 'without' the mind in this sense.

17 PHK 49.

18 3D 250. Note Berkeley's use of the Cartesian example of the wax imprint, in turn borrowed from Aristotle. The continuity of thinking is striking.

19 This is not to imply that ideas, even archetypes, *causally* affect God. Here Berkeley means nothing more than God and His ideas are in a two-place relation, one where God preserves ideas by perceiving them.

20 3D 240.

21 My thanks to Scott Ragland for suggesting this point.

22 3D 167. Original italics.

23 3D 168. Original italics.

24 3D 246.

25 PHK 87.

26 Geneviève Brykman has argued that archetypes play no role in Berkeley's immaterialism because he uses them only polemically to distance himself from the *material* archetypal views of those like Locke and Malebranche. I agree that Berkeley does attempt to distance himself from this kind of archetypal theory but insist that he has another strain of the view in mind. Brykman 1987, 103-12.

27 Berkeley 1948-57, II, 279-83, 292-4, Letters to Samuel Johnson, 25 November 1729 and 24 March 1730. These letters are also printed conveniently in Ayers 1975, 353-4.

28 Berkeley 1948-57, II, 285-6, Johnson to Berkeley 5 February 1730.

29 One possible explanation is provided by Berkeley himself, who complains of being ill in his first response to Johnson. Nonetheless, his illness had passed by the time he authored the second letter, which is still mysteriously cryptic concerning the issue of archetypes.

30 Here I intend 'continuous' not in the mathematical sense of 'not discrete,' but rather in the ordinary sense of 'not gappy.'

31 Yandell 1995, 414-15.

32 *Cf.* 3D 241.

33 3D 241.

34 Berkely 1948-57, VIII, 41, Letter to Percival, 27 November 1710.

35 3D 214, added in the 1734 edition.

36 Jolley 1996, esp. 544-8.

37 Belfrage 1987, 75.

38 Wenz denies that Berkeley extends his prohibition against abstraction to God, relying heavily on Berkeley's apparent Platonism in *Siris*, but I cannot say I find his analysis convincing. Robert McKim presents a persuasive rebuttal, and at any rate, my analysis here provides a sense in which divine archetypes can unify Berkeley's Platonistic passages in the *Siris* with his earlier statements about archetypes, although this is not the place to argue for that connection. *Cf.* McKim 1982.

39 A point of clarification. One might object that this interpretation reintroduces an intermediary in perception since God must have had ideas of the divine archetypes before He created them (hence we do not directly perceive God's ideas at all). As I hope is already clear, this is a misunderstanding. God's ideas -- our sensory ideas -- just *are* the archetypes. In this sense Berkeley's divine ideas are not properly archetypes at all (because there is no original/ copy distinction). God perceives all of them continually (for however long they exist). The ontic nature of ideas (external but dependent beings) places them 'outside' of God's mind, but they are no less God's ideas.

40 PC 823.

41 Berkeley allows that God can *perceive* sensory ideas without actually *sensing* them. *Cf.* PC 675.

42 One might object that although Berkeley does not explicitly assert this, he does so implicitly. At PHK 4 he writes that we perceive nothing other than "our own ideas or sensations." On my reading of Berkeley, however, the ownership of an idea is nothing more than being in a particular two place relation with it. Here, as elsewhere (cf. 3D 248), Berkeley is asserting only that this relation holds for a certain person. When I say that I am having an idea, I mean that I am in a particular relation with that idea. When I speak of 'my' ideas, I refer to the set of ideas which are relata in perceptual relations with me. Possessive pronouns fix one end of the relation, nothing more. I find nothing odd or unusual about this, given Berkeley's system.

43 Again, this does not entail that God senses as we do. *Cf.* PC 675.

44 Stubenberg 1990, 225.

45 *Cf.* 3D 247, where Berkeley claims that such disputes about sameness are idle.

[46] Berkeley even argues for the existence of God on the basis of this regularity. Since he argues *from* continuity *to* God, that is a good signal that he does not think he can completely characterize the divine (archetypal) realm. After all, he cannot use as premises in his arguments claims about a reality created by a being he is trying to prove exists. The ideas of God are an explanatory *result*, a hypothesis used to explain the sensible experiences we have.

[47] Mabbott 1968, 372.

[48] Stubenberg 1990, 224.

[49] One might note here that my reading of Berkeley generates an interesting consequence. Since there is a divine idea for each sensory idea perceived, there will be a rather large number of ideas maintained by God. If we further compound this by noting how each perception of the putatively same sensible object (the tree on the quad) might (and on my reading in fact does) require a new divine idea, the number of ideas God must maintain becomes astronomically large. And so it does. Yet there is nothing inconsistent or implausible about this result, at least nothing more counterintuitive than Berkeley's claim that material objects do not exist.

[50] There is another related difficulty, however. For Berkeley there is no such thing as misperception, only mistaken judgments based on perception. If I perceive a mirage, Berkeley is committed to the claim that I am accurately seeing an idea, and a divine idea. Yet such ideas are not 'real' on Berkeley's view because they are not connected to other ideas in an orderly (natural) fashion. So why would God create such ideas that cohere poorly with the rest of the divine order? What explains why we *appear* to 'misperceive?' Even without a theory of divine ideas this puzzle confronts Berkeley and so I do not take it to weigh against my interpretation.

[51] Mabbott 1968, 372. He adds another problem concerning privacy, which I have addressed above.

[52] Yandell 1995, 414.

[53] *Cf.* Grey 1952. The topic of Grey's paper runs only tangentially to the one here, but it is instructive to see how his analysis concerning putatively public objects edges him towards the view I endorse.

[54] 3D 213-14. Note again that 'in' in the last sentence only means ***dependence***, and does not indicate that the created world is literally (located) inside the mind of God. Indeed, arguing that the world, as a mental order of ideas, must have a physical location would be category mistake.

[55] 3D 248. Here Berkeley is attacking a Lockean notion of 'out of a mind,' where independence is assumed. That is, Berkeley claims his view is just as good as one that posits mind-independent archetypes.

[56] My thanks to an anonymous critic for bringing this concern to my attention.

[57] PHK 89. *Cf.* 3D 205, where ideas are "perpetually fleeting and variable."

[58] 3D 254.

[59] 3D 205-6.

[60] 3D 254.

[61] 3D 215, bold emphasis mine.

[62] Berkeley 1948-57, V, 157 (*Siris* 349).

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