Because.

Question: Hopeless Pairs

Answer: Bryon Hines ’15

(1) Some X is Y. Some Z is not X.

(2) No X is Y. Some Y is not Z.

(3) Some X is not Y. Some Y is not Z.

“All dogs are mammals” is a called a categorical statement because it describes the relationship between two categories of things, namely, dogs and mammals. Categorical statements come in four types: “All X is Y,” “No X is Y,” “Some X is Y,” and “Some X is not Y.” Sometimes a pair of categorical statements (called an enthymeme) becomes a valid syllogism with the addition of a missing statement. For example, the enthymeme

All dogs are mammals

All German Shepherds are mammals

becomes a valid syllogism with the addition of the missing premise “All German Shepherds are dogs.” In other words, an enthymeme of the form

All X is Y

All Z is Y

becomes a valid syllogism with the addition of the premise “All Z is X.” A few enthymemes, however, are hopeless: there’s no way to turn them into valid syllogisms, no matter what premise or conclusion is added. Using X, Y, and Z as the terms, how many such hopeless pairs can you find?

Submissions received by April 30 are eligible for first-place ($75) and second-place ($25) prizes. The more correct pairs you find, and the sooner you find them, the better your chances.

Question: Sucker Voting

Answer: Phil Bailey ’13

Though Katherine has come to the conclusion that her vote means quite literally nothing, Katherine should still vote in the 2016 election. I say this not because I believe her vote will have any real effect on the election, as the closest presidential election in United States history in 1960 between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, was won by upwards of 100,000 votes, but rather because by voting she is participating in an act of democratic government. In Locke’s political philosophy, one of his essential tenets is that government must have the consent of those it governs. Furthermore, Locke teaches that a person may only become a full member of society through, what must be a largely ceremonial act of express consent to the government. This of course poses a problem for many, as they do not perform an act of express consent. To this concern, Locke says that people consent to the government tacitly, simply by living in and using the infrastructure that the government has provided. For example, the use of public roads, municipal water or state funded educational institutions would be instances of tacit consent. Therefore, if Katherine chooses not to vote in the election of 2016, she would through her inaction, be tacitly consenting to whatever the elected government does. In other words, by not taking any action to change the course of government, however ineffectual it might be, Katherine is expressing her support for the current direction of government.

Detractors, however, might argue that Katherine’s act of voting is a completely ceremonial one. After all, it has been established, through the example, that Katherine’s dissenting vote would produce no measurable causal change in the government. To this charge, I agree that this act of express consent or dissent is completely ceremonial, just as any acts of tacit consent, through the use of government infrastructure, would be. In this sense, tacit consent and express consent share the same level of causal power, because they are both completely ceremonial acts of consent. Nevertheless, without the ceremonial act of express consent through voting, the non-voter shows contentedness or support through his or her inaction.

Although completely ceremonial, voting is an act of express consent or dissent for the government. By not voting in 2016 Katherine would be tacitly consenting to the government in power. In the end, when consent is required by the governed, a conscious choice of express consent, in my opinion, seems to be superior to a thoughtless act of tacit consent.

Katherine voted Democrat in 2008, in part because she wanted bipartisan reform of health care, the immediate closing of Guantanamo, and a significant increase in job prospects for young people. Still unemployed and feeling like a sucker by 2012, she hoped for real change by voting Libertarian. That didn’t work either.

Then she realized that she’d been suckered into believing something more subversive than the false promises of the earlier election. Although her vote technically “counts,” she has come to the conclusion that it makes no difference—not just too little difference to matter, but absolutely no difference at all. She can’t get past the fact that her single vote will inevitably be buried in the statistical noise intrinsic to vote counting on a large scale. The margin of error, in short, is always greater than one.

Katherine isn’t interested in hypothesizing about what would happen “if no one voted.” She is concerned only about the rationality of her own voting and has therefore resolved, as a matter of principle, not to vote at all in 2016. Can you convince her to change her mind?

Submissions received by March 18 are eligible for first-place ($75) and second-place ($25) prizes.

Question: Two Bicycles

Answer: Luke Schroeder ’13

Romeo is probably Fred’s “real” bike. Let me explain how I reach this conclusion.

Fred’s “real bike” will be the one that is identical with Romeo at time T-1, a time when Romeo is certainly Fred’s “real” bike. An identical bike will be the real one because it will be the same bike as at T-1, the only difference with it being temporal location.

These four arguments purport to explain identity:

1) Someone could argue that: because Juliet at time T-100 has the same material structure as Romeo as time T-1, Juliet is therefore identical with Romeo T-1.

But it cannot be the case that sameness of material parts is *sufficient* to preserve identity. If Romeo were to melt into a puddle of slag, the slag would be the same matter as constituted Romeo, it would not be Romeo. However, the slag would be identical with Romeo qua purely material entity.

2) Someone could argue that: because Romeo T-100 has the same formal structure and functional capacity as Romeo T-1, Romeo T-100 is therefore identical with Romeo T-1.

But it also cannot be the case that sameness of formal parts is *sufficient* to preserve identity. Presumably, Romeo is one of many models of a bike, meaning that there are a number of bikes with which he shares identical formal features. But these bikes are not identical with Romeo, although Romeo is identically a Model Z with them. So if we ask, gesturing towards Romeo, whether that bike is the same as this other Model Z, we would say yes, they are identical because they are both Model Z’s; they share the same formal features.

3) Neither sameness of material nor sameness of formal identity is sufficient to preserve identity. What about functional identity, the identity that derives from an object’s purpose? Someone could argue that: Romeo T-100 is identical with Romeo T-1 because it is *Fred’s bike* all the same, because Fred owns and uses Romeo T-100 as he does Romeo T-1.

But neither is functional identity sufficient by itself for identity. If Fred were to destroy Romeo and purchase Linda, Linda would be Fred’s bike, but Linda would not be identical with any version of Romeo. However, Linda would be identical with Romeo qua being Fred’s bike; being the bike that Fred owns legitimately and uses habitually.

4) Someone could argue that: because Romeo T-100 is the causal descendent of Romeo T-1, it is identical with him.

But a causal connection alone cannot explain identity. In a world where Romeo is actually a bicycle-transformer-robot, and transforms into the robot to fight the space aliens, we would not say that Fred’s bike is fighting the space aliens. Therefore, causal identity is not sufficient to explain identity.

So what kinds of conditions are sufficient? And what are necessary? Consider the following.

Within what bounds or contexts are formal features selected as identity conditions for an object? Let’s suppose that, at T-2*, Fred changes the back tire, R-1* of Romeo*, which is the first change. Now in T-1, R-2 has the exact same make as R-1. However, in T-2*, the R-2* has somewhat different treads than the R-1* (and so R-1 as well). Is Romeo T-2* identical with Romeo T-1*? Looking at it one way, we should say yes, because the two Romeos function remains the same—R-2* still functions as a tire does, so it still stays on the bike and is filled with air and made of rubber and helps keep the wheels turn. Thus, Romeo T-2* is identical with Romeo T-1*.

But if we think about formal identity in a stricter sense, Romeo T-2* cannot possibly be identical with Romeo T-1*. After all, the functions of the two tires at T-1* and T-2* do differ slightly because they are of a different make (perhaps R-2* has a better grip on wet surfaces or some such thing). Even though R-2* shares *most* functional capacities with R-1*, it does not share *all* of them, and therefore Romeo T-2* is not identical with Romeo T-1*.

The problems with the tires can be multiplied indefinitely. How much structural similarity must Romeo T-100* share with Romeo T-1*? If we think about this question under a strict conception of structural identity, then the answer is: the two bikes must share exactly the same structural features. But if we think about it under a looser conception, it seems that the answer could easily be: Romeo T-100* simply has to be a bike of Fred’s, and that is all. Thus, even if Romeo T-100* has completely different model, shape, color (and so on) parts than Romeo T-1*, Romeo T-100* is still identical with Romeo T-1*.

Well, which one of these conceptions is correct? What conception names the true Romeo for whom identity is such a problem? The answer, I submit, is this: there is no one “true” conception. It seems as if there are no *kinds* of identifying conditions that do not face the paradox of the heap. Material, formal, functional, and causal conditions all face the same problem. Saying that there is one true conception of conditions is like saying that there is one true *value* for gold, and one for water, and that a comparison of these values will tell us whether gold or water is more valuable. But neither gold nor water is simply more valuable than the other. Each is valuable according to context and the features of agent-evaluators in those contexts. As it is with value, so it is with identity. If we want to meaningfully ask “Is X identical with Y?” we need to be in fact asking “Is X identical with Y given such-and-such facts A,B, C, etc about the world, or given such-and-such contexts A, B, C?”

So is Romeo T-100 Fred’s real bike; is it identical with Romeo T-1?

At T-1, someone identifies Romeo as *some sort* of object. To identify Romeo as Romeo in the first place, somebody must name qualities that reference Romeo, that pick him out as an object in the world. What background concept framed the concept of the object in the first place?

Background concepts name conditions that an object must meet if it is to remain identical to itself under various circumstances.  For instance, it seems that my cactus must remain alive to stand any chance of preserving its identity. If some voracious herbivore were to somehow consume and thoroughly digest my cactus, the resultant digested material could in no reasonable way be called a cactus any longer, let alone *my* cactus.

So what sorts of background conditions do I accept as necessary and sufficient for the preservation of Romeo’s identity?

I think a reasonable view would hold that all four discussed conditions are jointly necessary and sufficient to explain identity; that each one must play *some* role in explaining identity. To argue this conclusion in full is beyond this blog post, so I will not argue for it. But I will sketch a reasonable case as to why Romeo T-100 is Fred’s real bike. It answers to the conditions as follows.

1) Romeo T-100 is functionally Fred’s bike as was Romeo T-1.

2) Romeo T-100 is also causally Fred’s bike because it was descended from Romeo T-1.

3) Romeo T-100 has the same formal features as Romeo T-1.

4) Romeo T-100 started out the same, materially as Romeo T-1.

So Romeo T-100 is the real bike.

Question: Two Bicycles

Answer: Ryan Rivas ’15

What we need to solve Fred’s bicycle dilemma are certain distinctions: namely, ontological and temporal distinctions. We are attempting to figure out which bike—Romeo or Juliet—is actually Fred’s “real” bicycle. In response to the problem, I propose that both bicycles are Fred’s real bike. The only difference between the bicycles is temporal.

First, let’s take a look at the Fred’s current bike, Romeo. The present bicycle is composed of numerous different parts, and when taken as a whole, the bike is completely different than it was when Fred first purchased Romeo. Call this current bike, Romeo-present (Rp), and the initial bike, Romeo-initial (Ri). The question is: What is the relationship between Ri and Rp? This question raises concerns about the identity of the bike and identity in general. In order to form a plausible and acceptable theory of identity, we must allow for the identity of an object, in this case the bike, Romeo, to undergo change without changing its essential identity. (This allowance is needed for obvious reasons: Are we the same person we were yesterday? Most would answer “yes,” despite the changes that occur to our person over the course of a day. Thus, the same case must be made for the bicycle.) Here, we need an ontological distinction. We are not looking at the individual parts of Romeo that have changed over time; rather, we are looking at Romeo as a whole. So, the relationship between the identity of Ri and Rp is not the individual parts of the bicycle but the functional use of the object as it persists over time. The bicycle, Romeo, despite having its parts changed on numerous occasions, has served the same purpose over time—namely, taking Fred from one destination to another.  Using this functional theory of identity, we can see that Romeo has remained Fred’s real bike the entire time because it has served the same essential purpose for an extended amount of time.

Defining identity in terms of functionality, however, brings up an objection that must be tackled before continuing on. Following my argument, one could claim that Romeo would stop “existing” if a wheel was taken off, rendering the bicycle unusable. And if the wheel was later reattached, then Romeo would “pop back” in to existence. This claim seems metaphysically weird: What happens to Romeo in the time between the wheel being taken off and put back on? It seems as if Romeo would go in and out of existence depending on the functional capability of the bike at present. Without going too much into the metaphysics of time, the answer to the objection is, simply, it depends the circumstances. The identity of Romeo spans a certain temporal distance, starting at Ri, and continuing on until the bike is incapacitated indefinitely, even if that event is in the future (call this event Romeo-final, Rf). Let’s imagine that the present Romeo loses its wheel and is incapable of performing the function that constitutes its identity (being ridden). If at some point in the future the bicycle will be fixed, restoring Romeo’s functionality, then Romeo still exists. Thus, the identity of Romeo spans from Ri to Rf, even if Rf is a future event in relation to the incapacitated Rp. We might not know currently if the bicycle will be repaired at a future date or not, but our epistemic limit does not preclude Romeo’s identity from persisting because identity has a set, specific temporal length.

Now, to the tricky part: What to do about Juliet, the bicycle composed of Romeo’s old parts? Each one of these parts were once attached and used by Fred while riding Romeo, albeit at various times. But the key here is time. These parts aided in constituting the whole of Romeo at different times and consequently represent a piece of Romeo at those different times. While each part, when detached from Romeo, continued to exist apart from Romeo, what we are focusing on here is the ontological entity that arises when all parts comprise one whole. (We could take a look at the identity of each detached part and how that specific part persists over time, but the concern here is the ontology of Romeo, the bike, with separate parts conjoined into one entity.) Consisting of parts taken from Romeo at different time, this new bicycle, Juliet, is a temporally motley Romeo. In other words, each part of Juliet is a piece of Romeo’s identity at specific times in the past.

We established above that Romeo’s identity spans from Ri to ¬Rf. Now consider the changes that Romeo undergoes during its existence. Imagine that at time T1, the bicycle’s wheel was changed and saved by the mechanic; at T2 the handle bars were changed and saved; at T3 the seat was changed and saved; and so on until the present, and all parts of Romeo are different than the original bicycle began with. The mechanic then assembles each of these parts from T1, T2, T3 and so on, creating the new bike he deems “Juliet.” This new bike has the same identity as Romeo, though under a new name, because the bike is a piece of Romeo at T1, a piece of Romeo at T2, and piece of Romeo at T3, but Romeo nonetheless. “Juliet” is merely the mixed, present-time instantiation of past temporal parts of Romeo’s identity (from Ri to Rp). To make the idea somewhat clearer, consider the follow analogy: If a person somehow, say, by some freak time traveling accident, became grotesquely disfigured and arrived in the present time comprised of the arms he had as a child; the body he will have as an old man; the head he has as an adult; and the legs he had as an infant; we would not consider the man a completely different person, or possessing a different identity. Rather, we would say he is the same person only possessing limbs from different times of his life. Juliet is much the same as the disfigured man, only in respect to Romeo. The Juliet bike has the different “limbs” of Romeo from different times but maintains the same identity as Romeo. Thus, “Juliet” is actually Romeo.

After a very roundabout examination, we can finally see that the two separate bikes, Romeo and Juliet, are in fact much the same and can both be considered Fred’s “real” bicycle, sharing the functional identity initially ascribed to Romeo. By making temporal distinctions of Romeo’s identity, we find that Juliet is Romeo from different, specific times but Romeo nevertheless.

Question: Two Bicycles

Answer: Will Russell ’15

Fred’s “real” bicycle is Juliet not Romeo. Fred’s “real” bicycle is Juliet because it consists of all of the original parts. However, it is not Fred’s bicycle any longer because he gave up ownership piece by piece. Juliet is the mechanic’s bike now. The parts once belonged to Fred, but they now belong to the mechanic. The “real” bike is still Juliet, despite Fred not having ownership. While Romeo is his bike, it is not his “real” bike. It is not his real bike because Romeo consists of parts that were not originally his. The parts were originally independent and not part of Romeo at conception because that is what made Romeo “real”. If a bald person gets hair implants, while he would own the hair, and it would be a part of him, it would not be his “real” hair. The new hair is made up “parts” like Romeo. Something that is real, is its original organic state. Romeo was once a “real” bicycle but as he had parts surgically removed and altered his “realness” faltered.

Question: Two Bicycles

Answer: Evan Boden ’15

Romeo is Fred’s “real” bike because as the components wear down, Fred exchanges them.  While the used components were once a part of Fred’s “real” bike they are no longer, for Fred’s “real” bike is the bike that Fred currently has.  What was once part of Fred’s “real” bike is no longer relevant.  The individual components are merely interchangeable parts that make Fred’s bike a physical entity.  In order for parts to be a part of Fred’s “real” bike, they must belong to Fred, which the removed parts no longer do. The pieces that are no longer part of Fred’s bike are no longer part of Fred’s “real” bike, and are now a part of the mechanic’s “real” bike.  If Fred bought new clothing and the mechanic took Fred’s old clothing, the mechanic would not become the “real” Fred.  Similarly, Juliet is not the “real” bike because it possesses pieces that were once part of Romeo.

Question: Two Bicycles

Answer: William Woodall ’13

I am going to argue and claim that both Romeo and Juliet are Fred’s bikes. First off, the old parts, which the mechanic saved, were still once used by Fred while riding, yet the parts were not totally worn down. If the mechanic saved all of the parts, which he replaced each time, then all of the parts which make up Juliet once belonged to Fred. The term “real” complicates the logic and could create alternate viewpoints. Romeo may be composed of new parts, unlike Juliet, yet Fred had the parts changed “gradually” which means at some point in time both old and new parts were being used as Fred’s “real” bike. Now that all of the parts have been exchanged, the mechanic finally had the chance to assemble a complete bike, which all the components used to belong to Fred. Romeo, despite being composed of new parts, at one point shared a mix of worn and new parts, which makes me think that those parts also belong and were handled and used by Fred, which means that Romeo is also Fred’s bike.

In conclusion, it makes sense based on the information that the bike did, in fact, change over time, yet Fred still possessed the bike and used it while the parts were continuously being modified and added, as needed. On the other hand, the mechanic, who held onto the old parts, and assembled Juliet still used the parts, which used to belong to Fred. Based on the evidence, the parts that used to belong to Fred also belong to Fred and thus both Romeo and Juliet can be justified as belonging to Fred over a wide time spectrum.

Fred is so meticulous about maintaining his bicycle, which he has dubbed “Romeo,” that he upgrades components well before they’re worn out. Over the years, he has had tires, brakes, wheels, and even the frame replaced. Indeed, Romeo has been gradually transformed, piece by piece, until not even a single original part remains.

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Fred, the frugal mechanic at the local bike shop has saved the old frame and every one of the old parts and has assembled the best of them into a complete, perfectly serviceable bike that he has decided to call “Juliet.”

Is Romeo or Juliet—or both or neither—Fred’s “real” bike, and exactly why?

Submissions received by Valentine’s Day are eligible for first-place ($75) and second-place ($25) prizes.